I'd like to unequivocally state from the outset that I believe his move to have been a good one because it was necessary. It was first and foremost a humanitarian obligation that we, as a country that has no qualms about intervening and that never ceases to proclaim its international interventions as part of a mission libératrice, could not ignore. Its urgency was made even greater by the fact that we were and are not alone in this mission. Not only are our typical western allies beside us in this undertaking, but we also have the backing of the Arab League, which took the initiative in calling for help in abating and hopefully ending the crisis in Libya.
The measured steps taken by Obama and his administration regarding Libya are not, as some of his usual critics have claimed, anti-constitutional or weak. They are a sign that gone are the days of America as a thoughtless, selfish bully that unilaterally charges against any nation it deems unfit of existing as it exists. Contrary to popular belief in this country and among its recent and current leaders, the United States is neither a prosecutor, nor an executioner vis-à-vis its global peers; and yes, that includes the countries we hate. No international organization assigned it those roles and it certainly did not acquire them by virtue of being the (arguably) sole democratic superpower. By virtue of the latter, it is merely an arbiter, and a limited, questionable one at that. It must, therefore, not take its moral responsibility—as well as its ability and willingness to militarily intervene—lightly, nor without an earnest consideration of the history of errors it has helped to write and has miserably failed to correct.
Regardless of the aforementioned justifications and moral obligations (abstract terms, I admit), it is important that the United States and its leaders not lose sight or critical consideration of the role of the U.S. in arming rebel forces or leaders in the past. I say this now, because there is talk on the news of CIA operatives on the ground in Libya, considering (or already) training and arming Libyan rebels. Surprisingly (and frighteningly so), not a single mention has been made of previous examples of arming rebels in the world, and particularly in the Arab world and the Middle East. I could not remain silent before this gaping maw.
Two ominous examples come to mind and we should all heed them and measure our current intents and future actions in Libya by them. First, there is the example of Iraq and the United States' close involvement with it during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). What did we do then? Throughout the 1980s, we surreptitiously armed Saddam Hussein, by then the undisputedly ruthless leader of Iraq, against a greater enemy of ours, Iran. Shortly thereafter, Iraq became an aggressor and consequently our enemy during the first Gulf War (1990-1991). As if that wasn't enough, by 2002 Iraq became this country's favorite enemy and Saddam Hussein our president's favorite villain. The man we had assisted in fighting our common (and for us, greater) enemy was now an enemy we 'had to' fight for the second time in fewer than fifteen years. Our unjustified attack on Iraq during the Second Gulf War is presently the subject of criticism (as well it should be!); but we must not forget the slightly more distant past in our relationship with Iraq. On the contrary, just as we remember our aggression on Iraq in 2003 as an unforgivable and senseless national error when there is talk of military intervention against X or Y country, so should we remember the fact that high-ranking officials and intelligence operatives of this country of ours armed and trained Saddam's regime throughout the 1980s.
My second example will speak, I believe, more clearly about the dangerous practice of arming just anybody who opposes those regimes or leaders whom we don't like. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States was much too eager to train and arm anybody—anybody—who fought against them. For Afghanistan, it was not a clear leader like Saddam Hussein, but rather numerous mujahideen who, while fighting against the Soviet Union, also fought amongst themselves and continued the latter civil war even after the shameful Soviet withdrawal in 1989. We were active and guilty of the beginning of a series of events that led to Afghanistan's utter destruction, and to the eventual ascent to power of the Taliban. The most notorious example of those armed by the U.S., however, is the one whose name we have all learned to hate: Osama bin Laden. If you need a jolt to your memory, Osama bin Laden is the most elusive terrorist and the one who has cost the United States billions of dollars and thousands of victims. After sleeping in the same bed with him, the CIA is now looking for him in vain.
Needless to say, these are not the only examples that have backfired on our pompous behind. A quick look at African or Latin American history merely strengthens the unmistakable pattern of the U.S. wrongly supporting one power against a more despised one, only to subsequently find itself an enemy of its former 'ally.' It is because of this pattern that African and Latin American countries have been plagued by anarchy, coups, violence, and genocide for decades; it is also because of this faulty pattern that we find ourselves fighting two wars in precisely those two countries and against the forces we aided the most and most furtively against our even more despised enemies at the time.
Let us, then, remember these friends-turned-enemies when we next speak of arming Libya's anti-Gaddafi rebels. However admirable their struggle against Gaddafi, we must not lose sight of what we will be doing if we decide to arm them: we will once again arm an unorganized, amorphous force against a common enemy, much like we did with Iraq against Iran and with Afghanistan's mujahideen against the Soviet Union. This is not to say that the Libyan rebels are already our enemies, nor that they will become our enemies. It is simply meant to add more measure to the steps we take in solving the crisis in Libya, which ought to primarily remain one of ensuring that as few lives as possible are lost. Therefore, the best thing to do is to exercise the greatest pressure possible through diplomatic means, or through political and economic sanctions on Gaddafi and his inner circle. The no-fly zone is a fair (however imperfect) first attempt at preventing massacres on civilians, but it is certainly not enough. Nevertheless, it must not be followed by our typical move of arming one side against the other in such conflicts. Obama has intimated that he is willing to break from traditional international policy; he must now go one step further in that attempt and unequivocally show that we are no longer a careless, thoughtless aggressor; that our primary concern is (indeed, as it is repeated ad nauseam) the preservation of individual human life; that we have learned from our actions in the world; that we have both the hindsight and the foresight necessary not to repeat errors that became tragedies, calamities, wars.
